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ABSTRACT  
In this paper we investigate the Dark Net which is the part of Internet accessible only via 
special browsers such as Tor. The Dark Net is the home of black-markets for illegal goods and 
services such as drugs, weapons and fake identities. In this study we investigate the Dark Net as 
a digital infrastructure over time to address the following research question: what are the forces 
underlying Dark Net markets? Our empirical approach is based on a set of techniques for 
accessing Dark Net marketplaces (DNM) and collecting various types of information on sites, 
transactions and users. We draw also on secondary sources such as reports of police 
interventions and interviews. Our analysis follows the tradition of critical realism to shed light on 
the generative mechanisms enabling Dark Net markets to operate and survive.  
                                                 
 
1 Corresponding author. pspagnoletti@luiss.it +39 0685225795 
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INTRODUCTION 
The illegal black markets that exist in the Dark Net can be considered the evil Mr. Hydes 
of the Internet, the ugly market of illegal drugs, guns, child porn and stolen documents. It is the 
place where the innovative power of technology is used for illegal and unethical purposes, and 
certainly is a place that most of us would not want to visit. It is a place that most of us prefer to 
ignore. In this paper, we argue that this disregard is unfortunate for two reasons. First, the Dark 
Net is a fact of the digital world, and increasing one. As Bartlett (2014) describes, the Dark Net 
is a strange mixture of crime and idealism, including both dissident sites, drug markets, terrorism 
and many things between, and should be researched as a global phenomenon.  
Second, the criminal part of the Dark Net, fueled by cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, is a 
real and serious threat (Europol 2017), and we need knowledge about it in order to mitigate the 
risks generated by its users (Kethineni et al. 2017; Samtani et al. 2017). Recent studies show how 
the Dark Net is contributing to the rise of new forms of crime by providing platforms supporting 
criminal interactions (Spagnoletti et al. 2018). Dark Net Marketplaces (DNMs) are facilitating 
illicit trade in hacking services (e.g. renting a Botnet or a Thingbot), fake identity documents and 
stolen information (Odabas et al. 2017) useful to conduct online fraud through spear phishing 
and advanced persistent threats (Chaudhry 2017; Hurlburt 2017; Kraemer-Mbula et al. 2013; 
Samani 2016). 
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DNMs - described also as cryptomarkets or black-markets - are e-commerce platforms 
supporting interactions between the buyers and sellers of illegal goods. Therefore, DNMs 
combine Dark Net capabilities for anonymous surfing with traditional e-commerce functions. 
Moreover, to conceal payments and money laundering cryptocurrencies are often used in DNMs. 
Specialized law enforcement agencies (LEA) units survey and occasionally raid these web sites, 
an example being when the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) closed the Silk Road site 
in 2013 (Soska and Christin 2015). Despite growing international cooperation among private and 
public institutions, attribution is hard for LEAs given the anonymity of interactions. DNMs 
enable new forms of crime that take advantage of digital capabilities, anonymity and online 
collaboration and are difficult to fight by focusing only on observable events. The situation calls 
for an interdisciplinary and multi-level reconceptualization of Dark Net infrastructures. This 
effort should be accompanied by critical analysis and the exploratory power of social science to 
stimulate sense-making processes and make decision-making more effective.  
We conceptualize Dark Nets as digital infrastructures where anonymity is a necessary 
condition for the active engagement of participants in online interactions. In digital 
infrastructures heterogeneous and autonomous human or organizational actors use information 
technology to allow adaptation to each other and their external environments (Hanseth and 
Lyytinen 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013). However, the anonymity of the technological 
and human components in Dark Nets can make this adaptation processes problematic and have a 
negative impact on infrastructure functioning. Our research questions are: how are digital 
Spagnoletti et al. The generative mechanisms of dark net markets 
 
Proceedings of the 13th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, San 
Francisco, December 13, 2018. 
 
4
infrastructures generated under conditions of anonymity? What are the underlying mechanisms 
that explain the functioning of the Dark Net infrastructure? 
In this study, we approach the Dark Net from both an empirical and a theoretical view. 
Empirically, we triangulate archival data from secondary sources with primary data obtained 
from interviews with LEA agents. We access the Dark Net using specially designed software that 
allows collection of substantial amounts of information on sites, anonymous actors, 
communications and transactions. Theoretically, we conduct an in-depth critical realist analysis 
which reveals the underlying forces shaping the evolution of the Dark Net infrastructure. We 
identify three generative mechanisms, i.e. Cybercrime scaling, Black platformization, Dark Net 
resilience.  
These causal structures explain how cybercrime is fueled by illegal trading, hacking and 
collective recovery within regular market operations and breakdowns. Compared to other 
empirical contexts, breakdown events are more frequent in the Dark Net, and therefore are easier 
to observe. This allows a deeper understanding of the innovation dynamics occurring within 
digital infrastructures. Moreover, we shed light on the governance of global information 
infrastructures, identifying how interactions among multiple actors with different roles (hackers, 
criminal communities, LEAs agents, buyers and vendors) shape the functionalities and 
characteristics of the Dark Net infrastructure. 
THEORETICAL LENS: DARK NET AS DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
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The term digital infrastructure2 encompasses a socio-technical interconnected structure of 
systems, people and organizations. Examples include Internet, financial systems, Facebook and 
airline booking systems. The extant literature on digital infrastructures studies the phenomenon 
in several contexts such as Internet development (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010), scientific 
infrastructures (Edwards et al. 2013), the evolution of mobile platforms (Eaton et al. 2015) and 
commercial developments.  
Digital infrastructures can be considered as an organizational phenomenon; they include 
both technical solutions and also the organizations and people that leverage the services. They 
also include the development and knowledge communities that produce the solutions and the 
support functions. Many infrastructures include several million people, organized in digital 
ecosystems. The literature highlights some key attributes: (i) digital infrastructures are different 
from traditional information systems; they are heterogeneous, often with no dominant actor 
(Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010); (ii) the dynamics of digital infrastructures are different; they are 
not designed but evolve through innovation, adoption and scaling (Henfridsson and Bygstad 
2013). Therefore, digital infrastructures are comprised of computing and network resources 
which allow multiple stakeholders to orchestrate their service and content needs by exploiting 
the externalities of digital platforms (Constantinides et al. 2018).  
                                                 
 
2 Also called information infrastructures or cyberinfrastructures 
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In this paper we adopt a broad definition of Dark Net, intended as the portion of the 
Internet providing digital capabilities to clandestine groups that design, implement and maintain 
its functionality. There are few studies of the Dark Net that adopt this perspective but there is a 
line of organizational research on terrorist and drug organizations. For instance, Milward and 
Raab (2006) found that resilient dark networks manage to rebalance differentiation and 
integration mechanisms in their internal structure and adjust to the new requirements. Therefore, 
they are difficult to break. What is less well known is how the interplay among the digital and 
social elements produces the observed outcomes. It is reasonable to expect that some 
mechanisms operating in traditional and legal digital infrastructures will work also in the Dark 
Net. However, it is expected also that due to its particular technical and social structures, other 
and quite different mechanisms will exist. Our methodological approach is designed to reveal 
these.  
METHOD: DATA COLLECTION AND DATA ANALYSIS 
We take a critical realist case study approach (Bhaskar 1998; Mingers 2004; Wynn and 
Williams 2012) which requires comprehensive data collection, and in-depth data analysis, 
deploying retroduction to uncover causal mechanisms. We are looking not for regularities at the 
level of events but deeper level contingent (and generalizable) mechanisms  operating on social 
and technical structures.  
The empirical context of our study is the ecosystem of the DNMs. We collected data 
from multiple sources: the characteristics of anonymity and secrecy of the markets and users 
analyzed make use of data triangulation and mixed methods especially important since no single 
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source can provide a complete picture of the phenomenon (Ferguson 2017). We collected data 
referring to the period 2009 to 2018, covering 10 years. The aim of our data collection was to 
obtain a full understanding of events, products, actors, processes and technologies occurring in a 
specific class of fraudulent practice: illegal trade in credit card information.  
Data were collected by a combination of crawling the Dark Net and analyzing open 
sources on the surface web. Table 1 presents an overview of our data collection strategies. 
We conducted a critical realist analysis aimed at uncovering the deeper causal structure 
explaining the empirical observations (Bhaskar 1998; Sayer 1994). We used the technique called 
retroduction (Wynn and Williams 2012). We built on the method described in Bygstad and 
Munkvold (2011) (Table 2 presents the process). We started by identifying key events. We 
define events as clusters of observations. Some events such as the establishment of Dark Net 
sites (Silk Road, BMR, Agora) and police interventions were obtained from secondary sources, 
others emerged from the data. These included sites’ offerings and the interactions among actors. 
Next we identified key components (assumed structural objects) of the case such as the Dark Net 
actors, the technologies and the users, and also the law enforcement actors.  
To assess the material collected, we conducted a theoretical re-description of our research 
object conceptualizing it as a digital infrastructure. This allowed a deeper analysis in the next 
step of retroduction in which retroduction of candidate mechanisms is crucial. Following 
Hedström and Swedberg (1996),  we looked for three types of mechanisms: how structure 
influences action (macro-to-micro), how action triggers action (micro-to-micro), and how action 
reproduces or changes structure (micro-to-macro).  
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Table 1. Overview of data collection strategies 
Category Aim Data source  Data collection method Data collected 
Events Evolution of the 
Dark Net  
Open web:  
Way back machine,  
Deepdotweb.com, 
Darkwebnews.com 
Identifying and counting 
activities per month 
Evolution of 122 
marketplaces in the 
deep web.  
Products  
 
Description of the 
illegal trade of 
financial 
documents and 
fake IDs 
Six Tor marketplaces: 
AlphaBay, Dream Market, Hansa, 
Leo, Outlaw and Bloomfield 
Crawling the web site and 
extracting information by 
the use of the Scrapy tool 
 
A dataset of 36 GB: 
AlphaBay (9120 
offers), Dream Market 
(18506 offers), Hansa 
(13068) 
Actors Vendors, Buyers, 
Administrators 
and LEAs 
 
a) Deep web: Five Tor 
marketplaces: Alphabay, Dream, 
Hansa, Outlaw, Valhalla 
b) Police reports  
c) Interviews with LEA operators 
Crawling the web site and 
extracting information by 
the use of the Scrapy tool 
Gathering of information on 
police operations 
A dataset of  PGP 
keys of vendors and 
buyers 
Process and 
operations by LEA 
Processes  Understanding of 
security measures 
a) Deep web: DNMs 
b) Open web: 
Deepdotweb.com and 
Darkwebnews.com 
Identification of relevant 
technologies and security 
mechanism  
Evolution of security 
functions 
implemented in DNM 
platforms 
FINDINGS 
In this short paper, we provide an overview of the evolution of DNMs in the past five 
years and discuss the mechanisms that explain the complex interactions among law enforcement, 
buyers and vendors of illegal goods and DNM platforms. We conduct an in depth analysis of the 
market for stolen data (e.g. credit card information) in which hackers - thieves sell information 
retrieved and services designed to acquire data and system-level access (Odabas et al. 2017). For 
space reasons, we provide only a short overview of the three mechanisms. 
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Figure 1. The establishment and termination of DNMs 
 
Figure 1 provides a fine grained depiction of the evolution of the DNMs. Our analysis 
identifies development between October 2013 and April 2018 and the number of active sites, and 
indicates some key events. The first Dark Net site of which there was some public awareness, 
Silk Road, was closed down by the FBI in November 2013. At that point, there were 6 active 
sites; this number had increased to more than 25 by summer 2014. The Onymous operation in 
October 2014 resulted in some of these sites being closed down. In April 2015, the Evolution site 
was closed down by the site administrators who pocketed the funds. However, in the months 
following the number of active sites increased. After a period of relative stability involving more 
than 20 active sites, in July 2017 Operation Bayonet reduced this number to 5. At the time of 
writing (October 2018), the number of DNM sites actives is still low (8). 
Through systematic retroduction we identified three high-level Dark Net mechanisms. 
Retroduction is a technique that looks for regularities not at the level of events but at the level of 
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causal mechanisms (Sayer 1994; Wynn and Williams 2012). These mechanisms operate on the 
structural elements and lead to observable events. Figure 2 provides a schematic illustration. 
 
Figure 2. Events, mechanisms and structure 
 
Mechanism 1: Cybercrime scaling 
The structure of a DNM is quite similar to the structure of any other two-sided platform, 
and enables vendors and buyers to trade at low transaction costs (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005). 
Similar to traditional e-commerce platforms such as Amazon and eBay, DNM buyers can be 
victims of different forms of deception such as non-delivery of items, product inauthenticity, 
misrepresentation and shill bidding (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2000, 2003; Yar 2016). This risk is 
accentuated in DNMs given the lack of transparency and the impossibility to recur to trusted 
third parties in the case of disputes.   
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However, our evidence on the evolution of DNMs (Fig. 1) shows that despite police 
interventions and exit scams, black-markets are flourishing and supporting buyers and vendors to 
trade illegal goods successfully online. How can buyer, vendor and platform owner trust one 
another? The volume of transactions handled by DNMs shows that it is relatively easy for a 
buyer to browse the offerings, select an object, purchase it anonymously and rate the vendor. 
Therefore, vendors can build reputation by providing additional services and information to 
guarantee the quality of the purchase. Examples include the functions for checking the validity of 
stolen credit cards and the refunding policies issued by vendors. On the side of platform owners, 
advanced trust functions such as escrow and PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) multisignature are 
implemented in DNMs to prevent deception. 
DNMs subsequent to Silk Road offer a larger variety of products and services such as 
credit card holograms, dumps, tools and guidelines for stealing and using stolen credit cards. 
These platforms activate network externalities by attracting new buyers and vendors and 
generating a cybercrime infrastructure. We describe this self-reinforcing mechanism as 
“cybercrime scaling”. We define cybercrime scaling as a process where a Cybercrime 
infrastructure enables vendors to build reputation, and successful purchases attract a critical 
mass of users to trade a greater variety of products and services. 
Mechanism 2: Black platformization  
The second mechanism identified is called black platformization. We observed above that 
the Dark Net infrastructure is a powerful resource for establishing a market in both stolen data 
and hacking tools. For instance, hackers can develop and sell new versions of malware and 
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provide instructions to deceivers using secure communication channels. Sets of personal data are 
sold to deceivers who conduct personalized phishing campaigns to perform large scale fraud 
using cryptocurrencies to collect payments and enable money laundering.  
Marketplace administrators constantly monitor the fast-evolving landscape of digital 
solutions and adapt their platforms by integrating functions to satisfy their users. Some black-
markets specialize in serving a particular community, others serve different purposes. Therefore, 
DNMs can be conceptualized as digital platforms (Constantinides et al. 2018) enriched with new 
capabilities to follow the emerging needs of criminal communities. The Dark Net infrastructure 
consists of a combination of buyers, vendors and law enforcement agents adopting and 
innovating digital tools for anonymous interactions. The use of a virtual private network (VPN) 
to connect to the Tor network and install a new instance of a DNM (e.g. Silk Road 2) is an 
example of such interaction. We use the term platformization to emphasize the dynamic and 
volatile character of the innovation process taking place in the Dark Net infrastructure. 
Black platformization is driven by the urgency to react to the new means adopted by 
LEAs in identifying online trade of illegal goods. Such crowd-based innovation exploits the 
potential of hacker communities whose cooperation is supported heavily by digital platforms 
(Samtani et al. 2017; Spagnoletti et al. 2015). For instance, payments methods for illegal goods 
changed from centralized services offered by actors in non-collaborating countries (e.g. Liberty 
Reserve in Costa Rica between 2006 and 2013) to decentralized systems based on blockchain 
technology (e.g. Bitcoin), to more recent tumbling tools for cryptocurrencies. These architectural 
changes were triggered by increased cooperation among LEAs (Hui et al. 2017) and 
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advancements in attribution methods and tools (i.e. “follow the money” practices). We define 
black platformization as a process where the Dark Net infrastructure enables criminals to sell 
new digital products and DNM’ administrators enhance the security and efficiency of 
transactions by implementing new features crowdsourced from hackers and online communities. 
Mechanism 3: Dark Net resilience 
The specific characteristics of anonymous trade (i.e. anonymity, untraceability and 
illegality of the goods exchanged) lead to sudden and frequent interruptions to normal 
functioning. Such interruptions can be caused by sudden and unpredictable events such as an exit 
scam or a police operation. In the first case, the deceivers exploit the opportunity created by the 
presence in the escrow system of substantial amounts of money: the deceiver may simply 
transfer the crypto-currency to his or her own account, and close down the site leaving no traces 
of either vendors or buyers. In the case of police operations, LEAs seize sites and block the trade 
of illegal goods.  
There are observable consequences of those events. For instance, the number of DNMs 
significantly reduces after documented police raids, while the Sheep Market and Evolution exit 
scams provoked reactions from the communities of users. In the Sheep Market case, users 
coordinated to collectively discover and disclose the identity of the deceiver. In the Evolution 
case, there was an increase in the number of active sites (see Fig. 1). After a period of “collective 
recovering” involving various different actions, we observe changes to both the process and 
technologies of the Dark Net. For instance, after an exit scam, vendors move to more trusted 
sites with enhanced security functionalities. Similarly, criminals react to the surveillance 
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activities of the police and experiment with new attack schemas based on the adoption of 
advanced tools such as peer-to-peer markets and payment systems, and encrypted point to point 
channels for communication (e.g. Tor on VPN). 
We define Dark Net resilience as a process where the Dark Net infrastructure enables 
successful and unpredictable actions by deceivers and LEAs to cause a breakdown in normal 
market operations that leads to a collective recovery among the user community determining the 
morphing of technological and fraudulent schemas.  
Table 2 presents a summary of the mechanisms and their link to the empirical data . 
 
Table 2. Outcome of retroduction (adapted from Wynn and Williams (2012)) 
Mechanism Definition Key events Data sources 
Cybercrime 
scaling 
Cybercrime infrastructure enables 
vendors to build their reputation 
and successful purchases attract a 
critical mass of users to trade a 
greater variety of products and 
services 
Trusted credit card vendor 
Carder.su forum and card 
checking systems 
Liberty Reserve and Bitcoin  
Carding offerings in DNMs 
Newspapers, court 
documents, police 
reports, blogs, Gwern 
Alphabay scraping 
Black 
platformization 
Dark Net infrastructure enables 
criminals to sell new digital 
products and DNMs’ admins 
enhance the security and 
efficiency of transactions by 
implementing new features 
crowdsourced from hackers and 
online communities 
Malware and ransomware 
Dataset of personal data 
Escrow and private messages 
Multisignature, Finalize Early 
and Forced PGP Vendor 
Newspapers, police 
reports, blogs, 
websites, Gwern, IA 
Dark Net 
resilience  
Dark Net infrastructure enables 
successful and unpredictable 
actions of deceivers and LEAs to 
cause a breakdown in the normal 
market operation that leads to a 
collective recovery action by the 
user community determining the 
morphing of technological and 
fraudulent schema. 
Sheep market and Evolution 
exit scams 
Peer to peer markets and 
payments 
LEAs cooperation to “Follow 
the money” 
Onymous and Bayonet 
operations 
Newspapers, blogs, 
websites, IA, 
interviews with LEA, 
court documents, 
police reports 
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